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Abstract
In the context of the devolution of public policy, recently much administrative
competence in land use policy is given to decentralised  forms of decision-making in
which local (or regional) authorities and the private sector play a more prominent role.
The paper describes the pathway to a more institutional multi-actor mode of urban
land use in the framework of deregulated land markets and maps out various relevant
aspects of competitive land use. In particular, an attempt is made to identify the
crucial ‘drivers’ of this complex decision process in an urban context, against the
background of revitalisation objectives for cities.
The analysis is illustrated by means of a comparative study on urban development
projects in The Netherlands. A particular type of qualitative classification analysis,
originating from artificial intelligence, coined rough set analysis, is developed to
assess and extract the most important key factors that are responsible for successes
and failures of recent development plans in Dutch cities. The approach allows us to
pinpoint the most critical policy variables.
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1. New Urban Challenges
Cities have always been a fireplace of economic activity and a source of
innovation (see Balchin et al. 2000, Bertuglia et al. 1998, and O’Sullivan 2000). The
urban economics literature has convincingly demonstrated that agglomeration
economies offer clear locational advantages to urban modes of living and working.
The so-called ‘new economic geography’ has even positioned urban economics in the
centre of international trade and networks (see e.g. Fujita et al. 1999). The emergence
of new economic opportunities for the city - or, in general, for large metropolitan
areas - has prompted a world-wide debate on the ‘new mission’ of urban
governments. A re-positioning of urban policy seems to be at stake, in which in
particular the interface between the public and the private sector is of critical
importance. The competitive advantage of cities - in terms of their potential to create
socio-economic progress - is largely contingent upon their ability to attract efficiently
operating firms which through their sense of entrepreneurial spirit are capable of
producing an added value out of their urban location. Several years ago already
Benjamin Chinitz (1961) has stated: “An urban area full  of competitive industries is
likely to create new business and more growth”. The question is, however, whether
current urban policies generate appropriate seedbed  conditions for a favourable re-
positioning of the city (see also Bertuglia et al. 1997 and Sivitanidou 1997).
Several background factors may be mentioned which necessitate a re-
orientation of urban policy. First, cities are increasingly becoming nodes in a broader
- often international - network economy (Castells 1996). They transcend the borders
of the regional and national territory and are more and more a player in an
international competitive force field. Next, the functional transformation of the
traditional industrial structure of urban areas towards a service and ICT orientation
means a radical change in urban policy-making; urban economic processes become
more volatile and business firms tend to become increasingly footloose. A major
challenge for the urban administration is not only to attract new firms, but also to keep
existing business life within the urban territory, a phenomenon also clearly witnessed
in modem ‘edge city’ development (see Garreau 1988 and Medda 2000). As a
consequence, modem cities - as functional-economic and administrative entities - are
more and more subject to interurban competition in which the city administration is
an important - but not the exclusive - stakeholder.
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In many countries this has led to a call for more local competence and
decentralisation  of administrative power. This devolution process has made cities
more aware of the need to develop tailor-made urban strategies and to create proper
incubator conditions for incumbent and new businesses. Essentially the urban
investment climate is a decisive factor for effective policy-making in a modem city.
(Adair  et al. 1999) Consequently, the balance between private and public investments
is a critical success condition for modem urban administration.
Against this background, the present paper aims to identify and investigate
critical success factors for urban restructuring on the basis of public-private
partnerships (PPP) in urban revitalisation and transformation processes. A PPP means
that the decision on a certain urban development plan is not exclusively a public
responsibility, but also a result of private and public negotiation and agreement
processes. This means in general the involvement of a multiplicity of stakeholders,
with different policy objectives and targets. Urban restructuring tends to become a
multi-actor task.
Clearly, this change in views on the competence of the public sector has
prompted an intensive debate on traditional arguments in favour of government
intervention (such as paternalism, presence of externalities, equity motives, ecological
and conservation motives, and scale advantages in natural monopolies). The
traditional intervention measures of the government were: price instruments (taxation,
subsidies), regulation (prohibitions, incentives), and own production under
government responsibility. A clear judgement of the performance of the public sector
was, however, usually hampered by an interference with the political process (see
Downs 1957 and Frey 1983),  in particular the lack of incentives in efficiency
improvement, the influence of the election process, and the robust and influential
position of the civil servants. It goes without saying that the city administration is
faced with rather complex institutional problems in a PPP context. Seen from this
perspective, this paper seeks to identify the critical success factors for urban
development plans (in particular, revitalisation projects). After a sketch of the recent
re-orientation of urban policies we will present a comparative study on urban
revitalisation projects in the Netherlands. In view of the small sample size and the
qualitative (often nominal) information on the performance of such projects, a new
meta-analytical tool, viz. rough set analysis, is applied. Several empirical results are
presented and the paper is concluded with some policy lessons.
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2. New Urban Pathways
In the light of the dynamic developments of cities sketched in Section 1, the
market of urban facilities deserves a closer look. Urban facilities are produced
nowadays in different institutional configurations and with different socio-economic
objectives. But in most cities, the efficient supply of public commodities is
increasingly brought under a market-based regime, so as to stimulate flexibility and
innovativeness in the city. This orientation towards the market sector leads to the need
to get also private stakeholders involved in the development of the urban economy.
These stakeholders may be project developers, banks, exploitation companies or
institutional financiers. Consequently, financial viability and profitability become
‘Leitmotives’ for urban development plans (cf. Harding et al. 1994). The general
expectation is that a market orientation for urban development plans will create more
flexibility, efficiency, efficacy, innovativeness, and socio-economic spillovers.
Clearly, market imperfection should not be overlooked (such as high entry costs, high
information costs, negative external costs, or monopolisation).  It is, of course, a major
challenge for urban administrations to strike a balance between different (often
conflicting) motives in a complex urban force field (cf. Healey et al. 1992).
The urban activity pattern has to reach an equilibrium between economic,
socio-cultural and ecological functions. This is not only necessary for the indigenous
urban policy, but also for the external marketing policy of the city (Kotler et al. 1993).
A marketing strategy is a common vehicle in an open competitive environment and
should address the business sector on the basis of entrepreneurial attitude of the urban
administration and with a view to global developments. Asworth  and Voogd (1988)
define ‘city marketing’ as follows: “Specific planning actions designed to initiate or
stimulate processes that improve the relative market position of cities in regard to
particular activities, such as attracting commercial investment, or improving the
effectiveness of service activities whether in the public or private sectors.” In this
context Porter (1995) claims: “Governments can assume a more eflective  role by
supporting the private sector in new economic initiatives. It must shift its focus from
direct involvement and intervention to creating a favourable environment for
business.” This means that the city administration is becoming an agency which
manages the urban edifice as a commercial market product. The concept of the
‘entrepreneurial city’ advocated by Hardin  et al. (1994) refers to a place “where key
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interest groups in the public, private and voluntary sectors develop a commitment to
realising a broadly consensual vision and mobilise both local and non-local
resources to pursue it”. Thus an entrepreneurial city is sensitive to the wishes of the
business sector, has a strong sense on innovativeness and flexibility, is project-
oriented, strategic in nature, seeks co-operation with the private sector (including
project developers), aims to create an added value for the city, and keeps an open eye
on socio-economic performances of the city. Clearly, given the multifunctional and
heterogeneous nature of the urban economy, a single and unambiguous performance
indicator is difficult to identify. For example, for urban residents the quality of the
environment, the access to public and socio-cultural facilities or a favourable socio-
economic position may be a key factor, while for business life such factors as
availability of land, accessibility, the local tax system, or a flexible and high quality
labour  market may be a crucial condition (see also D’Arcy and Keogh 1996 and Jones
1996).
In this context, Kotler et al. (1993) have made a distinction of urban policy
interest according to four main target markets, viz. visitors, residents & workers,
business & industry, and export markets (see for a further subdivision Table 1).
Visitors
- Business
visitors
- Non-business
visitors
Table 1. A classifice
Residents &
Workers
- Professionals
- Skilled workers
- Wealthy
individuals
- Investors
- Entrepreneurs
- Unskilled
workers
Business &
Industry
- Heavy industry
- ‘Clean’
industry
- Entrepreneurs
on of four urban main target markets
Export Markets
- Other localities
within the
domestic
markets
- International
markets
Source: Kotler et al. (1993)
Clearly, the focus of urban policy may either be on acquisition (aiming to
attract new firms and functions) or on restructuring or revitalisation (aiming to
reinforce the economic position of incumbent activities). In the first case an external
orientation is needed, whereas in the second case the policy attention is mainly
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directed towards firms already located in the city. In both cases however, the aim is to
maximise the incubator potential of inner city areas through the mechanism of
agglomeration economies (comprising scale, localisation,  urbanisation and linkage
advantages) in an increasingly globalizing world.
3 . Urban Policy in a Public-Private Domain
The emerging new role of urban governments prompts a discussion on the
competence of the public sector. The question whether - and if so, to which extent -
urban governments should intervene in the market has extensively been dealt with in
the transaction costs approach. In classical economic theory these transaction costs are
assumed away, e.g., because information is free and accessible without costs to all
economic actors. In the absence of transaction costs, even externalities will be
included in the market or government decisions, because in this case (costless)
negotiations will continue, until there is a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods (see
Rienstra 1998). But in practice, every transaction leads to costs (e.g. negotiating,
preparing of contracts, control, information acquisition, etc.) In such a case, there may
be a case for public intervention, e.g., to reduce monopolisation of information.
However, a government intervention also leads to new transaction costs. It is thus
clear that it is difficult to define an unambiguous balance between the tasks and
competences  of the public versus the private sector.
In the literature various arguments can be found which would justify public
intervention (see for an overview of arguments Fokkema and Nijkamp 1994). Usually
three major classes of argument can be identified, viz. the “infant’ activity argument,
the market imperfection argument (in particular, in case of imperfect competition,
imperfect information or malfunctioning markets), and the equity (or ethics or justice)
argument. It should be noted that transaction costs may play a preponderant role at the
interface of the private and public sector.
In the context of the urban land market, there is often not a clear
unambiguously operating market, as urban land use is the result of a multiplicity of
complex structures and institutions. It is sometimes argued that - instead of
substantive rationality - urban development strategies are much more driven by
procedural forms of rationality (in particular, learning capacities of organisations and
of the system at large). In this institutional perspective much emphasis is placed on
organisational models which also take into account transaction costs from
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opportunism in human behaviour (see Williamson 1985). As a consequence, the urban
regulatory system comprises economic, technological and social dimensions, which
have to be reconciled in a collective decision-making process in which mutual
agreements and contracts play a critical role. In urban rehabilitation strategies, for
instance, the behaviour of contractors, based on bounded rationality and opportunistic
behaviour, plays an essential role (see Moschandreas 1997). In case of externalities
(or social costs) the property right principle advocated by Coase (1937) is then an
important ingredient for urban policy-making. Burgenmeier (1999) has recently
argued that the Coasian definition of transaction costs (information, negotiation and
uncertainty) can be extended from those emerging on the market to costs outside the
market.
Clearly, as outlined above, the role of the public sector is increasingly moving
towards a diffuse  force field in which public and private interests have to be
reconciled. In the past years this has necessitated public decision-makers to seek for a
new ‘modus operandi’ with the private sector. And as a consequence, public-private
partnerships (PPPs)  have become a rather popular institutional configuration in urban
development policy, as they may create win-win situations as a result of mutual
benefits or socio-economic symbiosis. A PPP is an institutionalised  form of co-
operation of public and private actors who on the basis of their own indigenous
objectives work together for a joint target, in which both parties accept investment
risks on the basis of a predefined distribution of revenues and costs. In practice, a PPP
is not a fixed structural model for collaboration between public and private partners,
but just a tailor-made organisation for the realisation of a given project. Flexibility,
speed, cost efficiency and, in general, reduction of transaction costs are the main
benefits of a PPP.
It is - in the light of the above observations - no surprise that there is not a
single PPP model. Examples which demonstrate the variety are: the building-claim
model, the joint-venture model and the concession model. The various types of PPP
modals can illustratively, but certainly not exhaustively be typified as follows (see
Table 2).
Role public sector Role private sector Risk / financing
6
Traditional
Building claim
Joint venture
Concession
Table 2. Models for
conditions
PP
Source: Van der Burch (2000)
There is not an unambiguous choice for any of these models, as their
effectiveness and feasibility is contingent on various factors, such as the willingness
to co-operate. In this context, Mintzberg (1997) has formulated two hypotheses on the
effectiveness of organisational structures, viz. the congruence structure (a situation
when situational -or contingency- factors and design parameters have a close
matching) and the configuration hypothesis (a case of internal consistency among all
design parameters). The situational factors are mainly determined by features such as
stability, complexity, diversity, information and communication, and degree of
cooperativeness.
The number of fields in urban planning where PPP models are applied is
rapidly increasing. Especially in the area of infrastructure provision (e.g., parking
facilities), residential construction, urban development and revitalisation projects and
integral urban (or inner-city) development, PPP solutions have become rather popular.
Recently, also PPP arrangements in the field of public service provision are gaining
popularity. Clearly, the implementation of a PPP model is often not taking place
without problems. Some major barriers to a successful realisation of PPP
configuration are: the long planning horizon, the complexity of various projects, the
hold-up problem caused by a change in the position of partners, cultural differences
between private and public partners, the role of public subsidies, and the competition
rules for public projects as formulated by institutional actors such as the European
Commission (see also Van der Burch 2000).
In the light of the complexity and the heterogeneous nature of PPP projects, a
thorough investigation into the critical success (or failure) factors of such projects is
warranted, as it may generate important and transferable lessons for urban
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development planning. Against the background of the varying and diverse nature of
PPP projects, a methodology based on comparative case study research seems to be
most appropriate (see also Yin 1994). This will be further described in the next
section.
4 . A Comparative Meta-Analysis of Urban Development Projects.
The aim of this study is to develop a new methodology for a systematic
analysis of critical success conditions for urban revitalisation strategies, based on an
investigation and comparative evaluation of various empirical cases in The
Netherlands. This methodology is based on modem principles of research synthesis,
as developed in particular in meta-analysis (see for a general overview inter alia Van
der Bergh et al. 1998, Nijkamp and Pepping 1998, and Florax et al 200 1). Meta-
analysis aims to derive common elements from a series of previously undertaken case
studies, with a view to the identification of transferable lessons in the form of
conditional statements.
In the framework of our investigation, 9 Dutch studies on urban
redevelopment have been undertaken and subsequently analysed. The general
procedure to carry out the time consuming field work of these case studies was rather
straightforward: selection of potentially interesting cases, exploration of willingness
to co-operate among major stakeholders in the urban project concerned, assessment of
available information relevant for a systematic case study approach, execution of
structured interviews with main parties involved, collection of relevant data from
study reports including ‘grey’ literature and experts, and composition of a systematic
data base on features and success factors concerning the urban revitalisation project at
hand. Each of the finally selected and investigated projects had to fi~lfil  at least the
following criteria: it has a PPP feature, it concerns urban restructuring projects with a
clear economic function, the project has been (more or less) completed, and the
project is suitable for an ex post evaluation. Clearly, whether or not a project is
successful was not a selection criterion.
The following case study projects have been selected (see for details Van der
Burch 2000):
1 . Amersfoort: Eemskwartier (AME)
2. Amstelveen : Stadshart @MS)
3. ‘s-Hertogenbosch: Paleiskwartier (DEB)
4 . Eindhoven: De Witte Dame (EIN)
5. Heerlen: Centrumplan (HEE)
6. Maastricht: Sphinx Ceramique  (MAA)
7. Nijmegen: Brabantse Poort (NIJ)
8. Rotterdam: Beurspassage (ROT)
9. Waalre/Aalst:  Centrumplan (WAA)
For each case study detailed systematic information was put together in a data
matrix in which both within-case data and cross-data patterns are mapped out. It
should be noted that such information in our data base is qualitative in nature. In fact,
most available information has a categorical measurement scale (nominal, binary).
This had ultimately led to the construction of the following codified data matrix (see
Table 3).
Based on extensive interviews with stakeholders, administrative
representatives and local experts, also an assessment of the relative success scores of
each urban project (and its constituent factors) has been made. These results are
systematically mapped out in Table 4, according to executive, organisational,
operational, contractual, building and marketing criteria. Table 4 is represented at 2
levels of aggregation, ranging from a comprehensive aggregation to a disaggregate
representation over 3 items which each contain two of the above-mentioned criteria.
Clearly, the information in this table reflects some sort of an ‘average’ opinion from
various experts on the various performance indicators.
AME  A M S  D E B  E I N  H E E M M  N I J  R O T  W A A
A. Institutional arrangement
l_ Type of initiative 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
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L2. Type of actors’ co-operation
3. Spatial scope
B. Financing and risk
4. Financiers and risk bearers
5. Awareness of different risk
profiles of project parts
C. Contractual arrangements
6. Transparency of profit (ability)
requirements
7. Nature of contract
D. Revenues and costs
8. Financial transparency
9. Soil pollution costs
10. Expected rise in land price
E. Project organisation
11. Selection procedure of
partners
12. Stepwise  approach to project
components
Table 3. Codified data matr
Legend:
Al:
A2:
A3:
B4: 1: mainly public; 2: mainly private; 3: joint public-private activity
B5: 1: yes; 2: no
C6: 1: yes; 2: no
c7: 1: global; 2: detailed
D8: 1: good; 2: fair; 3: poor
D9: 1: high; 2: modest; 3: poor
DlO: 1: yes; 2: no
El1 1: open selection; 2: target group approach; 3: combination
El2 1: yes; 2: no
2 3 3 1
1 1 1 2
for 9 urban revitalisation projects
1: (mainly) public with limited number of players; 2: mainly private or public-
private with large number of players
1: traditional; 2: joint venture; 3: concession
1: local; 2:regional; 3: (inter) national
Success  score AM AMS D E B  E I N H E E  MAA NIJ R O T  W A A
E
!
S. Aggregate score 1 2 3 2 1 2 4 3 1
P,. Executive & Organisational 1 4 4 2 2 3 4 3 2
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P2. Operational & Marketing 2 1 3 3 2 4 4 3 1
PJ. Contractual & Building 2 3 3 3 1 1 3 4 1
Table 4. Assessment of success scores for each project
Legend:
1. Unsatisfactory
2. Acceptable
3. Successful
4. Very successful
The success scores in Table 4 are essentially endogenous variables to be
explained from the background variables in Table 3. According to Eisenhardt (1989)
applied case study research seeks to identify linkages among qualitative and/or
quantitative variables or indicators in a framework model with a view to theory
construction or hypothesis testing. For comparative case study research a cross-case
analysis may be helpful. In many cases a carefully selected sample of 5 to 10 cases
may be already be fairly representative. The problem is now that a conventional
statistical analysis (e.g., discrete choice modelling) cannot be applied because of the
low level of measurement (categorical) of the explanatory variables and the small
sample of observations. Therefore, we have to resort to other analytical techniques (in
particular non-parametric methods) to extract useful information on the drivers of
success from Table 3 and 4. An extremely powerful method, which will be discussed
in the next section, is rough set analysis.
5. An Artificial Intelligence Approach: Rough Set Analysis
In modem social science research we observe an increasing need for
quantitative research synthesis. This means that findings from previously undertaken
studies (either quantitative stimulus response studies or qualitatively described case
studies) are surnmarised in a quantitative form so as to draw common research or
policy lessons or to derive analytical statements that are transferable to other case
studies.
In this context meta-analysis is gaining importance as a tool for quantitative
research synthesis. Meta-analysis has already a long history in the natural and life
sciences, where (semi-) controlled research experiments are rather usual, so that under
fairly common ceteris paribus clauses a systematic effort can be made to draw
quantitative common results from previous research experiments. Meta-analysis aims
to offer a statistical underpinning for the comparison and synthesis of studies
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addressing largely the same research phenomenon. Various techniques have been
developed in this framework, such as meta-regression analysis or analysis of effect
sizes (see for a review inter alia Van der Bergh et al. 1997, Glass et al. 1994, Hedges
and Olkin 1985, and Matarazzo and Nijkamp 1997).
In applied case study research - even when it is based on a systematically
designed research format - we are often faced with results of a nominal character
(e.g., yes or no) or of categorical nature (e.g., a qualitative rank order). In such cases
the application of standard me&regression techniques is usually more problematic, in
particular if not only the response variables but also the stimulus variables have a low
measurement scale (or are only nominal in nature). Furthermore, the sample size of
comparative case study research is usually small, mainly for time or financial reasons.
In depth case study research based on a sample size of more than 10 is rather rare and
in many cases even not necessary (see Eisenhardt 1989). Clearly, conventional
statistical methods then fall short, so that we have to resort to qualitative non-
parametric statistical methods.
A recently developed and potentially promising method for comparative
research in case of nominal or qualitative information and small sample size is rough
set analysis (see e.g. Pawlak 1991, Slowinski 1995, Van der Bergh et al. 1997).
Rough set analysis belongs to the family of artificial intelligence based on
logical induction and deduction rules, and aims to perform a classification analysis on
‘soft’ data distinguished according to various distinct groupings. If a distinction is
made between response and stimulus variables (or ‘decision variables’), then rough
set analysis is able to identify causal linkages between classified stimuli and
responses. It is then able to derive conditional causal links of an ‘if.. ., then.. .’ nature.
These linkage statements mean essentially that an unambiguous result can be found
between the occurrence of certain stimuli in given data classes and the occurrence of
the response variable in a given class. This means that deterministic statements can be
derived based on a qualitatively codified data matrix. Thus, rough set analysis is a
multidimensional classification tool that may offer a causal explanation for the
emergence of phenomena which are described in nominal categories (or codes).
Clearly, the codification of qualitative data from a case study is critical, but the rough
set software allows for a sensitivity analysis on the codification (see also Nijkamp
2000). In any case, the construction of an information table is essential in any rough
12
-
set analysis, as the only way to discriminate among objects is to classify their
characterising  attributes.
In our case study we will use rough set analysis mainly as a tool for
Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) (see Glymour et al. 1997),  not only for a
retrospective analysis of qualitative data on existing case studies, but also as a
possible classification of new cases. In particular, we will use a relatively simple and
interpretable ‘pattern-focused’ model rather than a comprehensive explanatory model
for institutional decisions. Consequently, we will apply a data mining algorithm
which is able to produce a set of conditional statements on dependencies among
variables in a rules form.
The methodology of rough set analysis has extensively been described in the
literature and will not be replicated here. Details can be found in Polkowski and
Skowron (1998). The software has also various test statistics, so that the results can
easily be judged in their robustness and reliability.
The algorithm used here belongs to the framework of the ‘RoughFamily’
software system, which is able to perform a rough set based analysis of categorical or
nominal data, in particular by assessing the approximation of decision classes,
checking dependencies between attributes, identifying reduced subsets of attributes
etc. (see Slowinski and Stefanowski 1998). In this way we are able to extract
characteristic patterns from the data, to induce decision rules from a set of learning
examples, to evaluate the discovered rules by means of proper validation techniques
and to construct a knowledge representation in the form of decision rules.
The computer software program used here for the rough set analysis is RDAS
(version 1.0). This program had an easy user interface; commands are executed by
walking stepwise  through the menus and submenus. In our case we are especially
interested in the rules generator through which decisions algorithms can be derived.
These contain inter alia conditional statements (i.e., if..., then...), so that we can
identify under which conditions attributes of a phenomenon considered lead to a
certain performance of that phenomenon. In the next section we will offer results of
the rough set analysis applied to our urban revitalisation case studies.
6. Presentation and Interpretation of Results
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In this section we will present the results of the above rough set analysis at
two levels, viz. at the level of one aggregate performance score (S) for each of the 9
urban revitalisation projects under consideration and at the level of three partial
constituents (Pl, P2, P3) of the overall performance score (as presented in the success
score matrix in Table 4) (see for a detailed description Van der Burch  2000). Clearly,
the interpretation is valid in as far the case studies considered offer a fair
representation of urban development projects. In all cases analysed here, it turns out
that the accuracy and the quality of the rough set approximation is equal to 1, which
means that the reliability of the classification for the dependent variable and the
overall quality of the nominal classification is at its maximum. The 9 classes are
indeed totally distinguishable.
6.1 Aggregate results
Application of the rough set methodology to Table 3 in order to ‘explain’ the
aggregate performance score included in Table 4 leads to the following ‘decision
rules’ (see Table 5). These rules can be interpreted in a ‘compelling’ way. Given our
data base, they are unambiguously valid. The following logical rules can be distilled
from our case study research.
logical decision rules
nr if
1 C6=2
2 A2=3
3 D9=3
4 Al =2&Ell=3
5 Ell=l&DlO=l
then urban projects concerned
S=l AME HEE WAA
s=2 EIN MAA
s=2 AMS
s=3 DEB ROT
s=4 NIJ
Table 5. Rough set decision rules for aggregate performance score of urban
revitalisation projects
Rule 1
1 4
If the profitability requirements of stakeholders involved are not expressed clearly and
timely, then the performance of the urban revitalisation project at hand is
unsatisfactory. This hypothesis is supported by 3 out of the 9 cases (AME,  HEE,
WAA). For the interpretation of the remaining cases we have to consult Table 3 and
4, from which we can derive that the 6 remaining cities have been more transparent in
their profitability demands. The scores of these cities are fairly good; 3 cities (AMS,
EIN, MAA)  have an acceptable performance, two (DEB, ROT) a successful
performance and one (NIJ) even an excellent performance.
Rule 2
If the institutional PPP arrangement is based on a concession, then the overall
performance of the urban development project is in general acceptable. It has to be
added that from the joint venture arrangements in some cities a successful to even
very successful score can be observed (DEB, NIJ, ROT); however, one (AME)  is
unsatisfactory, to that a joint venture arrangement cannot be regarded as an
institutional model which will always lead to a good performance.
Rule 3
If there are no soil pollution costs, then the success of the project has an acceptable
performance from the public side. Closer inspection leads to the conclusion that this
statement is not shared by many projects, but for the remaining projects no
unambiguous result can be found. This means that the role of soil pollution in urban
revitalisation projects is somewhat fuzzy.
Rule 4
If the development initiative is a private responsibility or a joint private-public
responsibility with many private players, and if also the selection process of partners
has taken place via a combination of direct contacts and open selection, then the
project is certainly successful. For other combinations of features, the results are
ambiguous.
Rule 5
If the selection procedure for partners in a PPP constellation is open and if there is
reasonable expectation for land price rises in the project stage, then the development
project will be very successful. The combination of these two factors seems to be a
strong one, as the complementary statements (E 1 1 # 1 & D 1 0= 1 and E 1 l=  1 & D 1 O# 1)
lead to unfavourable performance results (mainly a success score of 1 or 2).
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In conclusion, the rules generation procedure has led to a collection of
interesting findings which - given the assumed validity and representativeness of the
data set - reflect important lessons for urban development planning at the interface of
public and private initiatives. The rough set analysis does not allow for the derivation
of other rules which have a hundred percent validity. But, of course, there may be
cases which in a majority of the situations leads to some interesting conclusions, but
these are - given the small sample - statistically difficult to judge. We will now turn
to an analysis of the constituent factors of the success scores at a more disaggregate
level.
6.2. Partial results
As mentioned above, the overall success score S is essentially a latent
indicator which can be decomposed into partial performance scores P 1, P2 and P3.
We will now apply the rough set analysis to each of these partial scores.
Executive and organisational  perjbmance (Pl)
Application of the rough set algorithm leads to the following decision rules of
an ‘if, then’ nature (see Table 6).
El1  = 1 &DlO=l AMS DEB
Table 6. Rough set decision rules for partial performance score (execution and
organisation)
Based on the results of this table and an interpretative analysis (via an
inspection of complementary information in Tables 3 and 4),  we may formulate - in a
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way analogous to Subsection 6.1, but without further comments - the following
lessons in the form of decision rules.
Rule I
In case of severe soil pollution, urban revitalisation projects appear to have a poor
performance in terms of execution and organisation.
Rule 2
A case of a traditional PPP arrangement leads to a successful implementation and
organisation of a project.
Rule 3
In case of a concession and absence of temporally phased subprojects, an urban
revitalisation project may lead to a fair performance in terms of execution and
organisation.
Rule 4
A case of reasonable financial transparency leads to a successful project outcome.
Rule 5
An urban project characterised  by a concession agreement and a direct selection of
partners has a successful execution and organisation.
Rule 6
In case of expected land price rises and an open selection procedure the execution and
organisation of the urban project concerned is very successful.
Operating and marketing per$ormance  (PI)
The decision rules for these success factors are contained in Table 7. The
logical rules are given below.
Table 7. Rough set decision rules for partial performance score (operation and
marketing)
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Rule I
Low soil pollution costs do not necessarily lead to a good operational and marketing
performance of a project.
Rule 2
In case of a local project orientation, the performance in terms of operation and
marketing tends to be poor.
Rule 3
A case of unclear prior transparency of profitability requirements and of a regional
project scope may lead to fair operational and marketing project outcomes.
Rule 4
In case of a private-oriented project (or a private-public model with many actors), we
may expect a successful operation and marketing performance of the project.
Rule 5
An urban revitalisation project with mainly private financiers, with mainly private
actors (or a joint arrangement with many players), and with a high degree of financial
transparency will lead to a very high success score for operational and marketing
indicators.
Contractual and building perj.hnance  (PJ)
The decision rules for the above class of performance scores are given in
Table 8.
Table 8. Rough set decision rules for partial performance score (contractual and
building)
Rule I
If there is no clear awareness of the cost composition and risk distribution of different
project parts, then the success score in terms of contractual and building performance
is very poor.
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Rule 2
In case of soil pollution costs the contractual and building performance is marginally
successful.
Rule 3
A case of transparent financial picture and a clear insight into profitability
requirements leads to a successful project performance from the perspective of
contractual and construction aspects.
Rule 4
If the financial transparency is ahight, then the contractual and building performance
is very high.
A more through and comprehensive judgement of the results from Subsections
6.1 and 6.2 leads to the conclusion that the aggregate and partial results are largely
consistent. Financial transparency and cost transparency form two critical success
factors, while also land price revenues, selection procedure of partners and
institutional constellation of a PPP arrangement may be seen as drivers of success.
7. Retrospect and Prospect
Urban policy in modem societies has increasingly a competitive character: it
seeks to achieve the highest socio-economic progress. In a situation of devolution of
administrative power cities are bound to be more entrepreneurial, more market-
oriented, and more international with an open eye to global networks. City marketing
is a proper instrument for a modem ‘entrepreneurial city’, provided urban
revitalisation policy is able to develop and create seedbed  conditions for favouring
and attracting business life. In this context, urban rehabilitation and urban
revitalisation (e.g., harbour front development, city centre transformation) are
spearheads of effective urban development policy. This requires also a critical
reflection and re-positioning of the urban economy and the role of the government.
Institutional reform (e.g., in the form of privatisation or PPP arrangements) may then
become a necessity, as it may lead to urban win-win situations with a great added
value. The task of the urban administration may then focus more on strategic
development, on long-term interests and expectations, and on a balance with respect
to environmental sustainability.
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Furthermore, also various specific issues may have to be addressed. Based on
a thorough comparison of 9 Dutch case studies we have come to the following
conclusions.
First, a PPP arrangement has a high chance to become successful, if it is
designed on the basis of joint venture model. This is also in agreement with the
transition of urban governments towards an entrepreneurial role.
Next, a clear, timely and transparent mapping of all costs, revenues and
profitability aspects of a PPP project is a sine qua non. Uncertainty in this respect is
bound to lead to a project failure.
The spatial scope of a project may also play an important role, in particular in
regard to the success of various project components. A larger geographical orientation
of a development project tends to increase its performance (e.g., by means of a
broader marketing strategy).
Soil pollution may be a problem, but less for the overall performance of a
project. Such costs are to be assessed in advance and the cleaning-up strategies have
to be agreed upon in advance. But for specific project parts the costs of polluted soil
may be problematic (especially during the organisational and executive stage).
And finally, a clear insight into the planning of project parts, the risk profiles
involved, and the way various partners are involved in different project elements is
critical for a good performance of an urban development project. In general, a PPP
arrangement requires a tailor-made constellation between the public and private
sector.
This study has tried to identify the critical drivers of successful urban PPP
projects with a view to urban revitalisation. The findings were based on an extensive
analysis of results of case studies in The Netherlands. It is clear that the lessons drawn
here may generate new hypotheses to be statistically tested in a broader review of
experiences.
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